ORCID
0000-0002-7183-8359
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2021
DOI
10.3390/rel12010064
Abstract
In his recent book Is a Good God Logically Possible? and article by the same name, James Sterba argued that the existence of significant and horrendous evils, both moral and natural, is incompatible with the existence of God. He advances the discussion by invoking three moral requirements and by creating an analogy with how the just state would address such evils, while protecting significant freedoms and rights to which all are entitled. I respond that his argument has important ambiguities and that consistent application of his moral principles will require that God remove all moral and natural evils. This would deleteriously restrict not only human moral decision making, but also the knowledge necessary to make moral judgments. He replies to this critique by appealing to the possibility of limited divine intervention, to which I rejoin with reasons why his middle ground is not viable.
Recommended Citation
Reichenbach, Bruce R., "On James Sterba’s refutation of theistic arguments to justify suffering" (2021). Faculty Authored Articles. 70.
https://idun.augsburg.edu/faculty_scholarship/70
Comments
This article was published in Religions at https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12010064 under a Creative Commons Attribution license