Humanitarian Intervention: Exploring the Number of Civilian Casualties in Conflict Zones Where Peace-enforcement Missions and Peace Keeping Mission Have Been Utilized

Konye Obaji Ori
University of Indianapolis

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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
EXPLORING THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES IN CONFLICT ZONES WHERE
PEACE-ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS AND
PEACE KEEPING MISSION HAVE BEEN
UTILIZED

Konye Obaji Ori, University of Indianapolis
You know, in the museum in Rwanda which commemorates the millions who lost their lives as the world looked the other way, there is a picture of a young boy called David - a ten year old who was tortured to death. His last words were "don't worry - the United Nations will come for us". But we never did. That child believed the best of us only to discover that the pieties repeated so often meant in reality nothing at all." (Gordon Brown, 2008)

In July 1995, with a UN peacekeeping mission present, a massacre took place just outside the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica, a city in Bosnia Herzegovina. During the civil war in former Yugoslavia, thirty thousand Muslim refugees had found protection in Srebrenica until the army of General Ratko Mladic deported them and subsequently killed eight thousand men. The United Nations had sent a peacekeeping mission to Srebrenica to ‘ensure full respect for these safe areas.’ Apparently, the UN could not live up to that promise. In 1994, a different, yet comparable debacle occurred in Rwanda. While millions were slaughtered in the African country, the United Nations stood by and watched. Peacekeepers that had been deployed to the area were withdrawn, while Rwandan civilians were left at the mercy of uncontrolled criminals (Bloq, 2006: pp. 201).

The UN peacekeepers – the Blue Berets—form one of the largest, best equipped, and international forces in the world. Yet the organization’s history is strewn with examples of its inability to keep the peace in places such as Srebrenica in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur. Currently there are UN peacekeeping operations running in 16 different locations throughout five continents from Haiti to Timor, and 120 countries contribute 100,000 troops who are paid out of the UN’s annual budget of $7.1 billion. But the UN forces lack the authority to impose themselves on the fighters.
Their rules of engagement do not permit it because they are forbidden to use their weapons unless they are fired upon (Aljazeera News, 2009).

This study explores whether there is a need to readdress the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in regard to protecting civilian populations in conflict zones. This question is important because over the past decade, conflicts have erupted across the globe, war crimes and crimes against humanity have been easily committed by warlords and rebels and the United Nations Security Council is yet to determine the best way to reduce civilian casualties in conflict zones around the world. The UN peacekeeping mission is mandated to protect civilians, however, their rules of engagement limit them to do so effectively.

This paper tries to answer this research question through a structured-focused comparison of the humanitarian casualty records in conflict zones where military force has been utilized against warlords and rebels in a bid to protect civilians, and where military force has not been utilized. I use a structured-focused approach (George 1979) within an outline of a ‘use of force’ theory. This methodology provides structure through clear definitions of key terms, provides focus by selecting a set of hypotheses to consider, and provides comparison through a set of case studies (analysis of written records), with an aim of discovering a pattern.

Although important, this paper does not focus on the different political, economic, or ethnic motivations and implications behind the decision to use or not to use military force. The main goal of this study is to observe or measure the difference in the number of humanitarian casualties in comparable conflict situations where military force has been utilized and where military force has not been utilized.
in a bid to protect civilian populations under threats of attack and death.

**Approach to Studying the Use of Force in Humanitarian Intervention**

The right of humanitarian intervention has been one of the most controversial foreign policy issues of the last decade, both when intervention has happened, as in Srebrenica and Liberia, and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda and DR Congo. Thus, the need to empower and utilize military force in order to protect civilians in conflict zones remains debatable. According to de Waal (2007: 1039-1054) the very act of raising the prospect of external military intervention for human protection purposes changes and distorts the political process and can in fact make a resolution more difficult.

Kuperman (2008: 49-80) argues that military intervention to protect civilians unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. In practice, intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm of military intervention resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence.

According to Woodhouse, “there is no such thing as a military quick fix” (2002: 14). In some cases like Somalia, military intervention did not work, and in other cases, the winning side went ahead to commit genocide against the defeated side.

These arguments against the use of military force to curb humanitarian crisis do not consider the ratio of the degree of humanitarian casualties when mere diplomatic and
political dialogues have been utilized, to the degree of humanitarian casualties when military force has been utilized. According to Christopher Clapham, the war in Rwanda was ended not by the three and a half years of international mediation, but by the military victory of the Rwanda’s Patriotic Front (Woodhouse, 2002: 11). Until the military intervention by the Rwanda Patriotic Front, over 800,000 civilians had been killed. Clapham agrees that the pursuit of mediation settlement can have the unintentional effect of prolonging the conflict with civilian population suffering most, while military actions have the effect of shortening the conflict by persuading those losing ground to accept a settlement. Citing Stedman and Licklider, David Shearer observes that in civil wars, in general, most settlements followed a military victory rather than political negotiations or mediated interventions (Woodhouse 2002: 9).

The Sierra Leone war of 1991 to 2001, for example, shows the difference in the number of civilian casualties before and after military intervention. According to Armed conflict reports, the overall war suffered a death range of 20,000 to over 50,000. In addition, 30,000 civilians, including children, were amputated by the rebels and an estimated 215,000 to 257,000 women were victims of sexual violence during the civil war. However, when the military peacekeeping force of the Economic Community of West African States known as ECOMOG came to the rescue of Sierra Leone civilians, Armed Conflicts Report claim that only about 6,300 civilians were killed from 1998 to 2000 (Armed Conflicts Report, 2002).

Such comparative observation of civilian casualties in conflict zones during peacekeeping missions (missions without a mandate to use military force) and peace enforcing missions (missions with a mandate to use military force), have lacked in previous researches. In 2001, Am-
bassador Lakhdar Brahimi submitted a review of peacekeeping operations to the Secretary General of the United Nations, in which the Ambassador stated that “peacekeepers, troops or police who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it” (Brahimi 2000: 62). Brahimi recommended forceful action of UN peacekeepers in case of threats to local civilians, irrespective of host nation consent.

The aim of an intervening army is simply to stop the killing. Peacekeepers mandated to use military force prevent, contain, moderate, and terminate hostilities, frequently in protracted social conflicts within states. De-escalation of violence is vital. Conflict resolution theory suggests causes of violent conflict and a contingency model for de-escalation, within which military peacekeepers separate belligerents to stop the violence and work closely with civilians to reduce its causes. Military doctrine suggests that liaison, negotiation, and force deployment help to control violence (Walzer, 2002: The argument about humanitarian intervention).

Plan of Study

The humanitarian casualty report is one source of information that has not been considered to the degree it should be considered, in regards to the argument of whether or not military force should be utilized in humanitarian intervention. Even though the humanitarian casualty records contain estimated numbers, they can help us to evaluate which mission (peacekeeping or peace-enforcing) has been more effective in reducing civilian casualties.

Before stating my plan of study I will define two key terms, relevant to this study; peacekeeping and peace-enforcement.
Peacekeeping: This term as defined by the United Nations is a way to help countries torn by conflict to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements they may have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. UN peacekeepers can include soldiers, civilian police officers, and other civilian personnel.

Peace-enforcement: This term entails the use of armed force to separate combatants and to create a cease-fire that does not exist. Force may also be used to create other peaceful ends such as safe havens for victims of the hostilities. The United Nations also uses this term to refer to forceful actions to keep a cease-fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire.

My plan of study is to compare the statistical records of civilian deaths in conflict zones where peacekeeping missions have been utilized and where peace-enforcement missions have been utilized. My study is on conflict zones such as Srebrenica in Bosnia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These samples are selected for my study because they have similar elements: warlords or rebel groups fighting for political or ideological supremacy with civilian populations as primary targets.

Civilian Death Records in the conflict zones selected for this study
**Srebrenica in Bosnia:**

When the United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR, was deployed to Srebrenica in 1993, the Security Council gave the peacekeepers limited firepower and a weak mandate which made it difficult for them to protect the civilian population against atrocities. In the summer of 1995, lightly-armed peacekeepers stood by powerless; as thousands of men in Srebrenica were murdered in what they had been told was a safe haven. Before the use of military force against Serbia, over 200,000 Muslim civilians had been systematically murdered. More than 20,000 were missing and feared dead and 2,000,000 became refugees (United Human Rights: Bosnia genocide). After the bombing it was reported that about 445 civilians were killed directly from the NATO bombings (Dankovic, 1999). However, it was Operation Deliberate Force (The Air campaign initiated by NATO/UNPROFOR) utilized against Bosnian-Serbs throughout the country in August and September 1995 which produced the results that allowed agreements to be reached (Berdal, 2002. pp. 64).

**Rwanda:**

As of July, 1994, over 800,000 civilians had been killed in Rwandan conflict (Historical chronology: Rwanda). The peace-enforcing mission of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) came to the rescue of civilians in Rwanda. The RPF soldiers saved tens of thousands of people from annihilation and relentlessly pursued those whom they thought guilty of genocide (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Before the RPF intervention, the civilian death estimated was between 500,000 and 1,000,000 in 1994. However, tens of thousands of civilians were reported to have been killed during the RPF forceful intervention (Armed conflict reports: Rwanda).
Sierra Leone:

Between 1998 and 1999, more than 6,300 people, mostly civilians, were killed during the Sierra Leone’s civil war. An estimate of the total civilian deaths ranges from 80,000 to 100,000 from 1991 to 2002. In addition, 30,000 civilians, including children, have had limbs hacked off by the warring rebels. An estimated 215,000 to 257,000 women were victims of sexual violence during the civil war (Armed Conflict report: Sierra Leone, 2000).

Liberia:

From 1989 to 1996 the total number of civilian deaths in Liberia was about 200,000. Between 1999 and 2003, the total number of deaths was estimated at 150,000 and over a hundred thousand people were displaced (Liberia: First and Second Civil War, 2000).

Somalia:

Independent media reports estimate that close to 400,000 Somali lives have been lost due to armed conflict between 1998 and 2007. According to Armed Conflict reports, in 2007 alone more than 6,500 civilians were estimated to have been killed in the conflict in Mogadishu with more than 8,500 wounded. These counts do not include military deaths which would likely increase the total number of casualties significantly.

However, the fighting in Somalia has been recurring. The second UN peacekeeping Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM II) was deployed in May 1993 to assist the Somalia people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life (Berdal, 2002. pp.56). However, the political situation in Somalia remains in a state of unrest, and the after-
effects of the 1989–1992 civil war has turned the country into a lawless, violent, and undemocratic state with an alarming humanitarian crisis.

**Congo:**

An estimated 350,000 people have been killed as a direct consequence of violence. In total, an estimated 5.4 million people have died as a result of the conflict, the vast majority from malnutrition and disease. The International Rescue Committee in conjunction with Australia’s Burnet Institute released a study in January 2008 showing over 45,000 non-combatant (civilian) deaths per month. The conflict has internally displaced an additional 3.4 million people (Armed Conflict Report: DR Congo, 2008).

**Sudan:**

So far, over 2.5 million civilians have been displaced and the death toll is variously estimated from 200,000 to 400,000 killed. These figures have remained stagnant since initial UN reports of the conflict hinted at genocide in 2004. Between 1998 and 2007, about 72,000 civilians were killed in the Sudan conflict directly from the fighting and subsequently from famine. The conflict in Sudan has caused the death of an estimated 2 million people, directly or indirectly, since 1983. Sudan currently has the largest internally displaced population in the world, estimated at 4 million people (The Genocide in Darfur, 2008).
Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict zone</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Civilian Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (UNPROFOR)</td>
<td>1992 to 1995</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace-enforcement (UNPROFOR/NATO)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (UNOMUR)</td>
<td>1993 to 1996</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace-enforcement (RPF)</td>
<td>1994 to 1995</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (UNOMSIL)</td>
<td>1998 to 1999</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace-enforcement (ECOMOG)</td>
<td>1997 to 1999</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (UNOMIL)</td>
<td>1998 to 1996</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace-enforcing (ECOMOG)</td>
<td>1990 to 1996</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping (UNMIL)</td>
<td>1999 to 2003</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (UNOSOM I)</td>
<td>1992 to 1993</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace-enforcement (US ARMY)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping (UNOSOM II)</td>
<td>1993 to 1995</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1998 to 2007</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (MONUC)</td>
<td>1999 to 2009</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Peacekeeping (UNMIS)</td>
<td>2005 to 2007</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping (UNAMID)</td>
<td>2007 to 2009</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984 to 2002</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data compiled from Armed Conflict Reports, Modern Conflict Data, and Britannica Year Book: Death Tolls
Independent Samples T-Test:
(Peacekeeping = 1, peace-enforcement = 0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Deaths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent Samples Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Deaths</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Deaths</td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Curve Estimation.

The result of this difference of means test is suggestive rather than statistically significant.
### Curve Fit:

#### Model Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Name</th>
<th>MOD_1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>CivilianDeaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equation</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td>Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Whose Values Label Observations in Plots</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Case Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded Cases(^a)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forecasted Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newly Created Cases</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Variable Processing Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Independent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Deaths</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Positive Values</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Zeros</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Negative Values</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Missing Values</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Excludes values for which user-defined missing values were specified but not indicated.
Model Summary and Parameter Estimates

Dependent Variable:
Civilian Deaths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equation</th>
<th>Model Summary</th>
<th>Parameter Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>R Square</td>
<td>F df1 df2 Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.061 .846</td>
<td>1 13 .374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The independent variable is Mission.

Results and Discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Peacekeeping</th>
<th>Peace-enforcement</th>
<th>Death Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Civilian Deaths</td>
<td>1992 to 2009</td>
<td>4,371,500</td>
<td>461,190</td>
<td>9 : 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over all, the result of the independent samples T-Test is suggestive rather than statistically significant, but it has shown through a comparison of recorded data that the civilian casualties in conflict zones where peace-enforcement missions have been utilized are comparatively lower than civilian casualties in conflict zones where peacekeeping missions have been utilized; within a conflict time frame.

However, it is mandatory to clarify that the death tolls are roughly estimated. Also, the number of civilians who die subsequently from the negative effects of the conflicts (hunger, diseases, displacements, etc) has not been accurately controlled for in this study.
Based on the Curve Fit data, the graph of civilian deaths plotted against the two types of peace missions utilized (peacekeeping coded as ‘1’ and peace-enforcement coded as ‘0’), show an inclining death rate as mission moves from peace-enforcement (0) to peacekeeping (1).

What this study intends to do next is assess what factors have accounted for this observation that peace-enforcement missions result in fewer civilian deaths than peacekeeping missions. This will be done by reviewing previous studies on the causes of civilian deaths.

Root Causes of Civilian Deaths in Conflict Zones

According to Swedish peace and conflict researcher Hultman (2006), in civil war, rebel groups often target civilians despite the fact that their actual target is the government. “Rebels are almost always considerably weaker than the government and are often lacking the
means for defeating government forces by military action. Therefore, they seek alternative means to pressure the government into making concessions. Violence towards civilians is one such strategy,” explains Hultman.

In her dissertation, *Targeting the Unarmed: Strategic Rebel Violence in Civil War*, Hultman shows that rebel groups primarily target civilians when they believe it will help them debilitate the government. “A strong parallel can be drawn between these types of attacks and terrorist attacks. Groups that rebel against a democratic state are more inclined to attack civilians,” she states (Hultman, 2006). She also describes violence towards civilians as an intentional group strategy rather than individual action taken by undisciplined rebels. By attacking the populations that the government is dependent on, rebels cause the government indirect harm (Hultman, 2006).

In her research paper, Hultman proposes that when fighting is low, governments try to avoid killing civilians unless the threat is large enough. Rebels, on the other hand, kill civilians to signal resolve in order to gain concessions. However, as the intensity level increases, control becomes more important, so both parties target civilians to establish territorial control and undermine the support of the opponent.

Using new data on killings of civilians, Hultman examines all conflict actors in an internal armed conflict from 1992 to 2004. The findings suggest that rebels use violence for communicative purposes in less intense conflicts, characterized by more violence when rebels are relatively strong and early in the conflict.

In more intense conflicts, on the other hand, violence is used to secure control and compensate for lack in military capacity – then the weaker groups kill more civilians, and they are likely to kill more civilians the longer the conflict. Governments kill more civilians when the rebel opposition is strong; surprisingly they kill fewer civilians the longer
the conflict and democracy is not found to have any affect on government behavior (Hultman, 2006).

Civilian fatalities in wartime have climbed from five percent at the turn of the century to more than ninety percent in the wars of the 1990s. New weapons and patterns of conflict that include deliberate attacks against civilians are increasingly turning children into primary targets of war. Even humanitarian activities that were once safe from attack are now treated as legitimate military objectives. Relief convoys, health clinics and feeding centers have all become targets (UNICEF Report, 2008).

**Responsibility to Protect:**

While peace enforcement has largely been avoided in the past, the level of violence with which peacekeeping operations in many areas, including the 1994 events in Rwanda where several Belgian soldiers (UNAMIR) were forced to watch the ongoing massacres and were ultimately killed without being allowed to engage, has shocked the international community and led to crisis where willingness to enter peacekeeping operations without the ability to use force is juxtaposed with an unwillingness of nations to enter their forces in potentially dangerous conflicts which would not otherwise involve them (Peace Enforcement, 2000).

In its efforts to help prevent civilian casualties in conflict zones worldwide, the International Crisis Group has consistently drawn upon the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This phrase is used primarily as an objective to provide a legal and ethical basis for humanitarian intervention—the intervention by external actors (preferably the international community through the United Nations) in a state that is unwilling or unable to prevent or stop genocide, massive killings, and other massive human rights violations. This has been done through peacekeeping
missions and peace-enforcing missions. Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged Heads of State and governments to embrace the 'Responsibility to Protect' as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (International Crisis Group, 2001).

**Stopping Rebel’s Atrocities:**

As Hultam's research has shown, civilians are the main targets of rebels and warlords. Thus the number of civilian deaths in conflict zones is to some degree dependent on whether or not peace missions are deployed and whether or not the peace missions deployed are mandated to utilize military force in curbing rebel groups from attacking civilian populations both in safe-zones and non safe-zones.

The mandates given to peacekeeping missions are often between traditional methods of creating demilitarized safe-zones and resolving disputes peacefully, such as ensuring ceasefire and peace agreements through negotiation and mediation, and delivering humanitarian aid under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (United Nations Peacekeeping).

Peacekeeping missions which often comprise of soldiers are sometimes armed, but do not have to engage in combat. Restricted by their rules of engagement, they have often allowed rebels and warlords the opportunity to attack civilian populations and commit crimes against humanity (Shawcross, 2000). It is impracticable to keep peace that has not been attained. In the seven conflict zones observed in this study, an estimated 4.3 million civilians have been killed between 1992 and 2009 under peacekeeping missions.

Peace-enforcement missions are mandated to use military force to combat rebels and warlords, forcing them to retreat, surrender, or agree to peace treaties as mandated in
their rules of engagement. The peace-enforcement doctrine emphasizes that force can be applied impartially if the focus of military action is firmly geared towards ensuring compliance with a given mandate (Berdal, 2002, pp. 62). In the seven conflict zones observed in this study, an estimated 461,190 civilians have been killed between 1992 and 2009 under peace-enforcing missions.

The initiation of numerous UN peace operations by the Security Council since the end of the Cold War has been bolstered by strongly worded and finely crafted resolutions. However, the emphasis placed in such resolutions on restoring peace and security by all necessary means loses its resonance when UN troops are constrained by their national law from employing sufficient force to achieve mission objectives (Stephen, 2002, pp. 157). The case of Somalia illustrates how the adoption, interpretation, and evolution of the peace-enforcement mandate, including the question of how the use of force critically depends on the interplay of personalities, competing motivations, and constraints (Berdal, 2002. pp. 62).

After the humiliations of Somalia and Bosnia, the Security Council of the United Nations was reluctant to get too deeply involved in Rwanda. At the time of the first reports of genocide in May 1994, there was already a small UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda. However, it was ill-equipped to deal with the scale of the bloodshed, and most countries immediately withdrew their contingents. Eventually the Security Council approved a force of 5,500, but most of the troops were not forthcoming. The UN has since admitted that it failed to prevent the genocide; and ignored warnings of what was to come (UN Peacekeeping Record: BBC News, 2000).

The UN's peacekeepers in Sierra Leone were ill-equipped and poorly trained. The rebels managed to steal UN weapons, tanks, and uniforms; and kidnap hundreds of UN peacekeepers. When the Nigerian-led force, Ecomog,
withdrew because of domestic pressures, the peacekeeping operation descended into chaos. The UN force was mainly drawn from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia—countries that had little experience of working together and whose soldiers were badly organized (UN Peacekeeping Record: BBC News, 2000).

Conclusions and Limitations:

At the most general level, this study through a structured focus comparison of the humanitarian casualty account of conflict zones suggests that the number of civilian deaths in conflict zones also depends on whether or not the deployed missions are mandated to utilize military force against rebels and warlords who are often responsible for civilian deaths and humanitarian crisis.

The result of this study strongly supported earlier research showing that warring factions can be made to retreat from civilian safe-zones or surrender and agree to peace talks when military force is utilized (Clapham, 1998). It was Operation Deliberate Force (the air campaign initiated by NATO/UNPROFOR) utilized against Bosnian-Serbs throughout the country in August and September 1995, and it alone which produced the results that allowed agreement to be reached (Berdal, 2002. pp. 64).

Although there are several issues to consider when deliberating over military force and humanitarian intervention, according to this study, the necessary first step by the UN Security Council in future peace missions deployments should be to reflect on the fact that civilian casualties under previous peacekeeping missions is higher than civilian casualties under previous peace-enforcing missions.

With the number of civilians (non-combatants) deliberately killed during conflicts, there is a need to readdress the mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions, deployed with a responsibility to protect. UN peacekeepers may be man-
dated to use collective action (including necessary military force) against genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The soldiers that constitute the peace missions should be able to defend themselves and the civilians they are there to protect. They should be able to respond to efforts by rebels and warlords to undermine peace agreements, or attack civilians.

After reviewing the failures and successes of previous peace-enforcement missions and peacekeeping missions, perhaps a simultaneous deployment of both missions during humanitarian intervention may be more effective in reducing humanitarian crisis as the UN assumes the responsibility to protect non-combatant populations.

Conversely, it is important to acknowledge that some of the key criticisms of this study relate to the fact that the cases observed are hand-picked, and possible antecedent variables that affect the dependent variable civilian deaths are overlooked. Choosing to randomly select the cases and exploring the nature, location, and the socio-political complications of the conflicts in relation to the civilian casualty record would be one way of addressing this criticism. Finally, the weight of this study is limited to conflicts within a state; such as ethnic, religious, racial, conflicts or conflicts.
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